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Abstract—We consider a two stage market mechanism for
trading electricity including renewable generation as an alter-
native to the widely used multi-settlement market structure.
The two stage market structure allows for recourse decisions
by the market operator which is not possible in today’s markets.
We allow for different generation cost curves in the forward
and the real-time stage. We have considered costs of demand
response programs, and black outs but have ignored network
structure for the sake of simplicity. Our first result is to
show existence (by construction) of a sequential competitive
equilibrium (SCEq) in such a two-stage market. We then argue
social welfare properties of such an SCEq. We then design a
market mechanism that achieves social welfare maximization
when the market participants are non-strategic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity markets in the US (and most of the world)
are operated as multi-settlement markets. A large fraction
of electricity is traded in the organized markets [7]. These
are run by an independent system operator (ISO) as multiple
forward markets, and a real-time or spot market. The forward
markets operate at various time-scales: day-ahead, hour-
ahead, etc. while the real-time market is opened five minutes
prior. These markets are operated independently of each
other, i.e., without recourse by the market operator though
the decision-making of the participants is obviously coupled.
Until a few years ago, the primary uncertainty while
trading in forward markets was in demand forecasts. As
we approach real-time, this uncertainty reduces to 5%, or
lower. With the high penetration of renewables we are
seeing today, there is increasing uncertainty in generation
as well. For example, in California, renewables account for
an estimated nearly 34% of the total retail energy sales [3].
In fact, the state has mandated 100% of power to come from
renewables by 2045 [4]. In other countries, most notably
Germany, it has been reported that at times 100% of power
came from renewables [1]. As can be imagined, this has
introduced an order of magnitude greater uncertainty in
net demand (demand minus renewable generation) than the
current market structures have been able to handle. There is
thus a need for new stochastic electricity market designs that
can handle such uncertainty.
Given that economic dispatch is a multi-stage process,
it only makes sense to couple the markets across various
timescales (in various forward and the real-time markets) and
allow for recourse decisions. This can enable achievement
of greater efficiencies through the marketplace than are
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possible with the current multi-settlement market structure
albeit with stochastic objectives of optimality. While it is
an obvious point, it is worth repeating that if appropriate
market architectures are not used for electricity trading, this
can lead to inefficiencies and even affect reliability. The
California electricity market debacle of early 2000s serves
as an important lesson [2].
In this paper, we study how multi-stage markets for elec-
tricity trading may work. We consider multiple generators
and load serving entities (LSEs). We consider two-stages: a
stage 1 (forward stage) where only a forecast of renewable
generation is available, and a stage 2 (the real-time stage),
when exact realization of renewable generation is available.
A dispatch decision is taken in stage 1. The economic
dispatch problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic pro-
gram with recourse. The recourse decision in stage 2 is used
to achieve power balance. Uncertainty in demand is ignored
though it only adds to uncertainty in net demand which does
not change things much. Network structure is also ignored
and will be treated in future work. The generators own
both dispatchable (i.e., controllable) primary and ancillary
plants, while each LSE owns a nondispatchable or stochastic,
renewable source, as is becoming more common [6]. In
addition, it is assumed that the LSEs run a demand response
(DR) program that gives each a lever to curtail demand to
some extent, and at a cost, in scenarios where generation falls
short of the overall demand [8]. As an emergency recourse,
the LSEs schedule rolling blackouts at high (societal) cost,
which thus must be avoided to the extent possible. We regard
all participants to be non-strategic and acting as price-takers.
Our main result is the proof of existence of a sequen-
tial competitive equilibrium in this two-stage market with
recourse, i.e., we show existence of first and second stage
prices such that the first and second stage generation and
consumption decisions achieve market clearance in stage
2, and power balance is achieved in real-time. We also
establish analogues of the first and second fundamental
theorems of welfare economics in the multi-stage setting.
Together these theorems state that the sequential competitive
equilibrium market allocation achieves market efficiency, i.e.,
social welfare maximization, and market efficiency can be
supported by such an equilibrium. We then outline a two-
stage market mechanism that can be used for multi-stage
economic dispatch.
Related work. The closest work to this paper is the
dynamic competitive equilibrium framework in [11] and [12]
which considers a much more general setting, but focuses
on showing existence of such a competitive equilibrium,
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while we are motivated by design of a multi-stage market
mechanism for economic dispatch that can be used to achieve
it. Other related work is [5] that does sequential equilibrium
analysis but in the current multi-settlement market, and [10]
examines the need for dispatching storage, again in current
multi-settlement markets. It concludes that storage decisions
can be left to other entities and the system operator need not
dispatch it without any loss in market efficiency. Neither of
these papers address the issue of alternative market designs
for multi-stage economic dispatch with recourse.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL
We consider a simple setting with I generators, and J
LSEs. The LSEs can be thought of as electric utilities. A
third entity, the independent system operator (ISO), operates
the power grid and plays the role of the social planner. For
simplicity we consider a single bus.
We consider a two-stage setting, where generation is
dispatched in the first stage (also called day ahead or DA)
and adjusted in the second stage (real time or RT) to fulfill
demand. Note, decision variables with subscript k = 1, 2
correspond to the kth stage.
Let Dj ≥ 0 denote the aggregate consumer demand, to
be met with procurements by LSE j. We assume that this
demand is inelastic, i.e., it does not change in response to
changes in first or second stage prices.
LSE j’s stochastic, renewable generation source has ran-
dom integer valued generation level Wj ∈ [0, wj ], where
wj ∈ Z+. For simplicity, from this point we consider
the vector of renewable generation W = (W1, . . . ,WJ )
⊤
takes on finitely many values and has associated probability
mass function denoted p = (p0, . . . , pw). This probability
distribution is assumed to be common knowledge amongst
all participants in the market. Renewable generation incurs
zero marginal cost.
Each LSE may purchase energy in both the DA and RT
markets, at prices P1 and P2(w) (given W = w), respec-
tively, where P2 : R+ → R. In our finite scenario setting, P2
can be considered as the vector P2 := (P2(0), . . . , P2(w))
⊤.
Denote the amounts purchased by the LSE in the first and
second stages as yL1,j and y
L
2,j(w), respectively.
Additionally, we assume that consumers participate in de-
mand response programs, wherein they are compensated for
curtailing their consumption in response to LSE requests or
other signals. Specifically, given that yL1,j has been scheduled
at the close of the first stage market, andW = w, LSE j may
request that consumers reduce their aggregate energy demand
by amount xL2,j(w), at the overall cost of cdr,j(x
L
2,j(w)).
Having scheduled consumption yL1,j in the first stage, we
allow that the LSE may effectively schedule a shortfall in
energy provided to its consumers, by procuring a quantity of
energy in the RT market less than residual demand D−yL1,j.
Such an action incurs blackout cost cbo(z
L
2,j(w)), where
zL2,j(w) = D − w − y
L
1,j − y
L
2,j(w)− x
L
2,j(w). (1)
We assume that the LSE is price taking. Therefore,
given P1 and P2, renewable generation level w, as well
as consumption decisions yL1,j and y
L
2,j(w), and demand
response and blackout decisions xL2,j(w) and z
L
2,j(w), the
utility enjoyed by the LSE’s customers is
piLj (y
L
1,j , y
L
2,j(w), x
L
2,j(w), z
L
2,j(w)) := −P1y
L
1,j
− PL2 (w)y
L
2,j(w)− cdr,j(x
L
2,j(w)) − cbo(z
L
2,j(w)).
(2)
Each LSE seeks to maximize the expectation of (2) with
its first and second stage decisions. Given yL1,j , generation
levelW = w, and second stage price schedule P2, the LSE’s
second stage optimization problem is
(LSE2j) max
yL
2,j(w),x
L
2,j(w)
zL
2,j(w)
− P2(w)y
L
2,j(w) − cdr,j(x
L
2,j(w))
(3)
− cbo,j(z
L
2,j(w))
s.t. yL1,j + y
L
2,j(w) + x
L
2,j(w) (4)
+ zL2,j(w) ≥ Dj − wj
yL2,j(w) ≥ 0, x
L
2,j(w) ≥ 0, (5)
zL2,j(w) ≥ 0. (6)
Note that (4) is an inequality in order to avoid infeasibility
scenarios in which Dj − wj < 0, i.e., renewable generation
exceeds residual demand Dj − y1,j .
Let piL2,j(y
L
1,j ;w,P1, P2) denote the maximum utility
achievable in (LSE2), given first stage decision, renewable
generation level and prices. Then, LSE j’s first stage opti-
mization problem, given prices P1 and P2, is to maximize
its summed first stage utility, P1y
L
1,j , and expected maxi-
mum second stage utility with respect to the uncertainty in
renewable generation
(LSE1j) max
yL
1,j
− P1y
L
1,j + E[pi
L
2,j(y
L
1,j;w,P1, P2)] (7)
s.t. yL1,j ≥ 0. (8)
We consider two different sources of power generation
for each generator. The first is a primary dispatchable non-
renewable power station owned by the generator i, which
can be scheduled to produce amount yG1,i ∈ R+ at cost
c1,i(y
G
1,i). We assume that this generator is inflexible, so that
once scheduled, its generation level must remain fixed.
Secondly, generator i has access to a secondary or ancil-
lary dispatchable source, such as a gas turbine. Specifically,
having scheduled primary generation amount y1,i, and then
observed the renewable generation realization W = w, the
generator may choose to produce secondary energy amount
yG2,i(w) ∈ R+ at cost c2,i(y
G
2,i(w)).
It is assumed that ancillary energy produced in excess of
consumer demand can be disposed of at zero cost, or sold
in a separate spot market which we do not consider here.
Generation capacity and ramping constraints are ignored for
sake of simplicity.
The generator is compensated for first stage generation yG1,i
at price P1. Given W = w, the generator is compensated for
second stage generation yG2,i(w) at price P2(w).
We assume that each generator is price taking, i.e., its
supply decisions yG1,i and y
G
2,i(w) do not affect the prices
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in either stage. So, given prices P1 and P2, renewable
generation level W = w, as well as dispatch decisions yG1,i
and yG2,i(w), the generator i’s profit is
piGi (y
G
1,i, y
G
2,i(w)) := P1y
G
1,i − c1(y
G
1,i)
+ P2(w)y
G
2,i(w)− c2(y
G
2,i(w)).
(9)
Given P2 and renewable generation level w, generator i
maximizes its second stage profit:
(GEN2i) max
yG
2,i
(w)
P2(w)y
G
2,i(w) − c2(y
G
2,i(w)) (10)
s.t. yG2,i(w) ≥ 0. (11)
Let piG2,i(w,P2) denote the generator i’s maximum achievable
second stage profit, given W = w and P2. Then, in the first
stage the generator i solves the following problem:
(GEN1i) max
yG
1,i
P1y
G
1,i − c1(y
G
1,i) + E[pi
G
2 (w,P2,i)] (12)
s.t. yG1,i ≥ 0 (13)
Though it appears in the objective of (GEN1i),
E[piG2,i(w), P2] is only an additive constant when optimizing
over yG1 , reflecting the fact that the generator’s supply
decisions in the two markets can be made independently.
We separate the two generator optimization problems to
emphasize that the generator observes W = w before
selecting yG2,i(w).
Finally, the ISO is responsible for enforcing the balance
of energy supplied and consumed in each stage (ISO):
(ISO)
∑
i
yG1,i =
∑
j
yL1,j , and
∑
i
yG2,i(w) =
∑
j
yL2,j(w).
(14)
In order to study the welfare properties of the allocations
included in the sequential competitive equilibrium definition
in Section III-B, we now introduce a two-stage social plan-
ner’s problem (SPP) corresponding to our two settlement
market model. As in the static case, the SPP is concerned
with the combined welfare of all market participants. Given
renewable generation level W = w, the aggregate welfare in
our setting is given by the sum of generator profits and LSE
utility specified in (9) and (2),
piSPP(w) :=
∑
i
piGi (yˆ
G
1,i, yˆ
G
2,i(w))
+
∑
i
piLj (yˆ
L
1,j , yˆ
L
2,j(w), xˆ
L
2,j(w), zˆ
L
2,j(w))
= −
∑
i
(c1,i(yˆ1,i) + c2,i(yˆ2,i(w)))
−
∑
j
(cdr,j(xˆ2,j(w)) − cbo,j(zˆ2,j(w))) ,
where (yˆG1,i, yˆ
L
1,j, yˆ
G
2,i(w), yˆ
L
2,j(w), xˆ
L
2,j(w), zˆ
L
2,j(w)) for all i,
j, and w are the social planner’s first and second stage deci-
sions, the second stage decisions made with the knowledge
thatW = w. Note that the aggregate welfare does not depend
upon market prices.
Let yˆG1 = (yˆ
G
1,1, . . . , yˆ
G
1,I)
⊤. Defining yˆL1 similarly, given
(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 ) and W = w, the social planner’s second stage
optimization problem is
(SPP2) max
yˆG
2
(w),yˆL
2
(w)
xˆL
2
(w)zˆL
2
(w)
−
∑
i
c2,i(yˆ
G
2,i(w)) (15)
−
∑
j
(cdr,j(xˆ
L
2,j(w)) + cbo,j(zˆ
L
2,j(w)))
s.t.
∑
j
yˆL2,j(w) =
∑
i
yˆG2,i(w) (16)
yˆL1,i + yˆ
L
2,i(w) (17)
+ xˆL2 (w) + zˆ
L
2 (w) ≥ Dj − wj ∀ j
yˆG2,i(w) ≥ 0, yˆ
L
2,j(w) ≥ 0 ∀ i, j
xˆL2,j(w) ≥ 0, zˆ
L
2,j(w) ≥ 0 ∀ j
Define piSPP2 (yˆ
G
1 , yˆ
L
1 ;w) as the maximum aggregate welfare
achievable in the second stage, taking first stage decisions as
given, and W = w. Then, the SPP’s first stage problem is:
(SPP1) maximize
yˆG
1
,yˆL
1
−
∑
i
c1,i(yˆ
G
1,i) + E[pi
SPP
2 (yˆ
G
1 , yˆ
L
1 ;w)]
(18)
s.t.
∑
j
yˆL1,j =
∑
i
yˆG1,i (19)
yˆG1,i ≥ 0, yˆ
G
1,j ≥ 0 ∀ i, j (20)
The optimal solutions yˆ∗1 and (yˆ
∗
2 , xˆ
∗
2) to (SPP1) and
(SPP2) are called efficient sequential allocations.
Following assumptions are made throughout the paper.
Assumption 1: c1,i, c2,i, cdr,j and cbo,j are strictly convex,
increasing, differentiable, and nonnegative over R+, for all
i and j.
We first argue that problems SPP1 and SPP2 can be
combined into a single one-stage optimization problem.
Lemma 1: The two stage problem (SPP1)-(SPP2) is
equivalent to the following single stage problem:
(SPP-P) maximize
yˆG
1
,yˆG
2
yˆL
1
,yˆL
2
,xˆL
2
,zˆL
2
−
∑
i
c1,i(yˆ
G
1,i) (21)
−
∑
i
∑
w
c2,i(yˆ
G
2,i(w))pw
−
∑
j
∑
w
cdr,j(xˆ
L
2,j(w))pw
−
∑
j
∑
w
cbo,j(zˆ
L
2,j(w))pw
s.t. yˆL1,j + yˆ
L
2,j(w) + xˆ
L
2,j(w) (22)
+ zˆL2,j(w) ≥ Dj − wj ∀w, j∑
j
yˆL1,j =
∑
i
yˆG1,i (23)
∑
j
yˆL2,j(w) =
∑
i
yˆG2,i(w) ∀w (24)
yˆG1,i ≥ 0 ∀ i, yˆ
L
1,j ≥ 0 ∀ j (25)
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yˆG2,i(w) ≥ 0, yˆ
L
2,i(w) ≥ 0 ∀w, i (26)
xˆL2,j(w) ≥ 0, zˆ
L
2,j(w) ≥ 0 ∀w, j. (27)
For proof, see Appendix.
In particular, “equivalent” in Lemma 1 means that
(SPP-P) and (SPP1) have the same optimal objective
value. Further, if (yˆG∗1 , yˆ
L∗
1 , yˆ
G∗
2 (·), yˆ
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·), zˆ
L∗
2 (·))
is optimal for (SPP-P), then (yG∗1 , y
L∗
1 ) is optimal for
(SPP1) and (yG∗2 (·), y
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·), zˆ
L∗
2 (·)) is optimal for
(SPP2). Conversely, if (yG∗1 , y
L∗
1 ) is optimal for (SPP1)
and (yG∗2 (·), y
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·), zˆ
L∗
2 (·)) is optimal for SPP2
then (yˆG∗1 , yˆ
L∗
1 , yˆ
G∗
2 (·), yˆ
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·), zˆ
L∗
2 (·)) is optimal for
(SPP-P). Similar arguments to the one in the proof of Lemma
1 can be made for the generator and LSE problems, giving
(GEN-Pi) max
yG
1,i
,yG
2,i
P1y
G
1,i − c1,i(y
G
1,i) (28)
+
∑
w
(
P2(w)y
G
2,i(w) − c2,i(y
G
2,i(w))
)
pw
yG1,i ≥ 0, y
G
2,i(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (29)
and
(LSE-Pj) max
yL
1,j ,y
L
2,j
xL
2,j ,z
L
2,j
− P1y
L
1,j −
∑
w
P2(w)y
L
2,j(w)pw (30)
−
∑
w
cdr,j(x
L
2,j(w))pw
−
∑
w
cbo,j(z
L
2,j(w))pw
s.t. yL1,j + y
L
2,j(w) (31)
+ xL2,j(w) + z
L
2,j(w) ≥ Dj − wj ∀w
yL1,j ≥ 0, y
L
2,j(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (32)
xL2,j(w) ≥ 0, z
L
2,j(w) ≥ 0 ∀w. (33)
III. SEQUENTIAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND
EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
In a single stage market for a single good, a competitive
equilibrium is specified by a price P and quantity x such that,
given P , producers find it optimal to produce, and consumers
find it optimal to purchase, quantity x of the good. Thus, the
market clears, i.e., demand equals supply.
To understand the outcome of the two-stage market, we
consider a sequential version of competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1: A sequential competi-
tive equilibrium (SCEq) is a tuple
(yG∗1 , y
L∗
1 , y
G∗
2 (·), y
L∗
2 (·), x
L∗
2 (·), P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 (·)) such that,
for all i and j, given P ∗1 and P
∗
2 (·), y
G∗
1,i is optimal
for (GEN1i), y
L∗
1,j is optimal for (LSE1j), and, given
w and P2(w), y
G∗
2,i (w) is optimal for (GEN2i) and
(y∗2,j(w), x
∗
2,j(w)) is optimal for (LSE2j), and the markets
clear in both stages in all scenarios:∑
i
yG∗1,i =
∑
j
yL∗1,j , and
∑
i
yG∗2,i (w) =
∑
j
yL∗2,j(w), ∀w
(34)
Note that in the SCEq definition, P ∗2 (·) and y
G∗
2,i (·), y
L∗
2,j(·),
and xL∗2,j(·), for each i and j, are functions. We say that
for problems involving shortfall decisions, that the ancillary
generation and DR decisions form a solution, since they are
enough to uniquely determine the shortfall decisions. For
example, (yˆG∗2 (·), yˆ
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·)) solves (SPP2).
We first investigate the existence of a sequential com-
petitive equilibrium in the two-stage market. Let λˆ∗1 and
λˆ∗2 = (λˆ
∗
2(0), . . . , λˆ
∗
2(w))
⊤ denote optimal dual selections
associated with constraints (23) and (24) in (SPP-P).
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, a sequential
competitive equilibrium exists, and is given by
(yˆG∗1,i , yˆ
L∗
1,j, yˆ
G∗
2,i (·), yˆ
L∗
2,j(·), x
L∗
2,j(·), λˆ
∗
1 , λˆ
∗
2(·)), where
(yˆG∗1,i , yˆ
L∗
1,j, yˆ
G∗
2,i (·), yˆ
L∗
2,j(·), x
L∗
2,j(·)) is the primal solution to
(SPP-P), and (λˆ∗1, λˆ
∗
2(·)) is an optimal dual solution to
(SPP-P).
Proof: In addition to feasibility constraints (22)-
(27), the optimal to solution to (SPP-P), denoted as
(yˆG∗1 , yˆ
L∗
1 (·), yˆ
G∗
2 (·), yˆ
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·)), satisfies the following
KKT conditions:
c′1,i(yˆ
G∗
1,i )− λˆ
∗
1 ≥ 0 ∀ i (35)
yˆG∗1,i
(
c′1,i(yˆ
G∗
1,i )− λˆ
∗
1
)
= 0 ∀ i (36)
c′2,i(yˆ
G∗
2,i (w)) − λˆ
∗
2(w) ≥ 0 ∀ i, w (37)
yˆG∗2,i (w)
(
c′2,i(yˆ
G∗
2,i (w)) − λˆ
∗
2(w)
)
= 0 ∀ i, w (38)
λˆ∗1 −
∑
w
µˆ∗j (w)pw ≥ 0 ∀ j (39)
yˆL∗1,j(w)
(
λˆ∗1 −
∑
w
µˆ∗j (w)pw
)
= 0 ∀ j (40)
λˆ∗2(w) − µˆ
∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (41)
yˆL∗2,j(w)
(
λˆ∗2(w) − µˆ
∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀ j, w (42)
c′dr,j(xˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (43)
xˆL∗2,j(w)
(
c′dr,j(xˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀ j, w (44)
c′bo,j(zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (45)
zˆL∗2,j(w)
(
c′bo,j(zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀ j, w (46)
µˆ∗j (w)(Dj − wj − yˆ
L∗
1,j − yˆ
L∗
2,j(w)
− xˆL∗2,j(w)− zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) = 0 ∀w
(47)
µˆ∗j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (48)
Due to Assumption 1, the optimal solution to (SPP-P) is
unique when it exists. We now show that this solution also
gives optimal solutions to (GEN-Pi) and (LSE-Pj) for each
i and j.
In addition to the nonnegativity constraints listed in (29),
the optimal solution for (GEN-Pi) satisfies
c′1,i(y
G∗
1,i )− P1 ≥ 0 (49)
yG∗1,i
(
c′1,i(y
G∗
1,i )− P1
)
= 0 (50)
c′2,i(y
G∗
2,i (w)) − P2(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (51)
yG∗2,i (w)
(
c′2,i(y
G∗
2,i (w)) − P2(w)
)
≥ 0 ∀w (52)
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In addition to the feasibility constraints (31)-(33), the optimal
solution for (LSE-Pj) satisfies
P1 −
∑
w
µL∗j (w)pw ≥ 0, (53)
yL∗1,j
(
P1 −
∑
w
µL∗j (w)pw
)
= 0 (54)
P2(w)− µ
L∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (55)
yL∗2,j(w)
(
P2(w)− µ
L∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀w (56)
c′dr,j(x
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (57)
xL∗2,j(w)
(
c′dr,j(x
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀w (58)
c′bo,j(z
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (59)
zL∗2,j(w)
(
c′bo,j(z
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀w (60)
µL∗j (w)(Dj − wj − y
L∗
1,j
− yL∗2,j(w) − x
L∗
2,j(w)− z
L∗
2,j(w)) = 0 ∀w
(61)
µL∗j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (62)
where µL∗j is the optimal dual vector corresponding to
constraint (31) in (LSE-Pj). Next, we define candidate prices
P1 = λˆ
∗
1, and P2(w) = λˆ
∗
2(w) ∀w. (63)
Next, we have the following claim.
Claim 1: (yˆG∗1 , yˆ
L∗
1 (·), yˆ
G∗
2 (·), yˆ
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·), P1, P2(w))
is an SCEq, where P1 and P2(·) are defined in (63), and
(yˆG∗1 , yˆ
L∗
1 (·), yˆ
G∗
2 (·), yˆ
L∗
2 (·), xˆ
L∗
2 (·)) is the unique solution to
(SPP-P).
Proof: Starting with (GEN-Pi), substituting for P1 and
P2(w) in (49)-(52), and selecting y
G
1,i = yˆ
G∗
1,i and y
G
2,i(w) =
yˆG∗2,i (w) gives
c′1,i(yˆ
G∗
1,i )− λˆ
∗
1 ≥ 0 (64)
yˆG∗1,i
(
c′1,i(yˆ
G∗
1,i )− λˆ
∗
1
)
= 0 (65)
c′2,i(yˆ
G∗
2,i (w)) − λˆ
∗
2(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (66)
yˆG∗2,i (w)
(
c′2,i(yˆ
G∗
2,i (w)) − λˆ
∗
2(w)
)
≥ 0 ∀w, (67)
which are identical to (35)-(38). Thus, given P1 and P2(·),
(yˆG∗1,i , yˆ
∗G∗2,i(·) is optimal for (GEN-Pi). Therefore, yˆ
G∗
1,i is
optimal for (GEN1i) and yˆ
G∗
2,i (w) is optimal for (GEN2i)
for all w, given yˆG∗1,i .
Turning to the LSE’s problem, substituting for P1 and
P2(w) in (53)-(62) and selecting y
L∗
1,j = yˆ
L∗
1,j , y
L∗
2,j(w) =
yˆL∗1,j(w), x
L∗
2,j(w) = xˆ
L∗
1,j(w), z
L∗
2,j(w) = zˆ
L∗
1,j(w) for all w
gives
λˆ∗1 −
∑
w
µL∗j (w)pw ≥ 0 (68)
yˆL∗1,j
(
λˆ∗1 −
∑
w
µL∗j (w)pw
)
= 0 (69)
λˆ∗2(w) − µ
L∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (70)
yˆL∗2,j(w)
(
λˆ∗2(w) − µ
L∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀w (71)
c′dr,j(xˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (72)
xˆL∗2,j(w)
(
c′dr,j(xˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀w (73)
c′bo,j(zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (74)
zˆL∗2,j(w)
(
c′bo,j(zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) − µ
L∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀w (75)
µL∗j (w)(Dj − wj − yˆ
L∗
1,j
− yˆL∗2,j(w) − xˆ
L∗
2,j(w)− zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) = 0 ∀w
(76)
µL∗j (w) ≥ 0 ∀w (77)
Further selecting µL∗j (w) = µˆ
L∗
j (w) for all w makes
(68)-(77) identical to (39)-(48). Thus, given prices (63),
there exists a Lagrange vector µL∗j (·) such that together
(yˆL∗1,j , yˆ
L∗
2,j(·), xˆ
L∗
2,j(·), zˆ
L∗
2,j(·), µ
L∗
j (·)) satisfy the KKT condi-
tions for (LSEj). Therefore, yˆ
L∗
1,j is optimal for (LSE1j) and
(yˆL∗2,j(w), xˆ
L∗
2,j(w), zˆ
L∗
2,j(w)) is optimal for (LSE2j) for all w,
given yˆL∗1,j .
Finally, due to constraints (23) and (24), the market clears
at each stage. Therefore, we have shown that the tuple given
in the claim is a sequential competitive equilibrium. Thus,
we have proven both the claim and Theorem 1.
Social Welfare Theorems: There is an important connec-
tion between equilibrium and efficient allocations, described
by the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
We can now state the first and second theorems of welfare
economics for the two-stage setting. We say that a sequen-
tial equilibrium supports an allocation if the allocation is
included in the equilibrium.
Theorem 2: (i) Every sequential competitive equilibrium
supports an efficient sequential allocation. (ii) Conversely,
an efficient sequential allocation can be supported by a
sequential competitive equilibrium.
Proof: To prove the first statement, note that by def-
inition, under a sequential competitive equilibrium, markets
clear in both stages. This assertion may be seen as equivalent
to posing the following ISO problem [11]:
(NET-P) max
y˜G
1,j ,y˜
G
2,j
y˜L
1,j ,y˜
L
2,j
P1

∑
j
y˜L1,j −
∑
i
y˜G1,i

 (78)
+
∑
w
P2(w)
∑
j
y˜L2,j(w)pw −
∑
w
P2(w)
∑
i
y˜G2,i(w)pw
(79)
s.t.
∑
j
y˜L1,j =
∑
i
y˜G1,i,
∑
j
y˜L2,j(w) =
∑
i
y˜G2,i(w), (80)
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and then requiring that (yG∗1 , y
L∗
1 , y
G∗
2 (·), y
L∗
2 (·)) as given in
the SCEq definition in Section II solves (NET-P).
Summing the objectives of all agents, i.e. (GEN-Pi),
(LSE-Pj) over all i and j, along with the objective of (NET-
P) recovers the objective of (SPP-P). Similarly, collecting the
constraints from all of the individual (GEN-Pi) and (LSE-Pj)
problems, along with (80) recovers the full set of constraints
found in (SPP-P). Together, therefore, (NET-P), along with
each (GEN-Pi) and (LSE-Pj) represent a decomposition
(SPP-P).
Selecting the sequential equilibrium solution for (SPP-P),
(35)-(48) become
c′1,i(y
G∗
1,i )− λˆ
∗
1 ≥ 0 ∀ i (81)
yG∗1,i
(
c′1,i(y
G∗
1,i )− λˆ
∗
1
)
= 0 ∀ i (82)
c′2,i(y
G∗
2,i (w)) − λˆ
∗
2(w) ≥ 0 ∀ i, w (83)
yG∗2,i (w)
(
c′2,i(y
G∗
2,i (w)) − λˆ
∗
2(w)
)
= 0 ∀ i, w (84)
λˆ∗1 −
∑
w
µˆ∗j (w)pw ≥ 0 ∀ j (85)
yL∗1,j(w)
(
λˆ∗1 −
∑
w
µˆ∗j (w)pw
)
= 0 ∀ j (86)
λˆ∗2(w) − µˆ
∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (87)
yL∗2,j(w)
(
λˆ∗2(w) − µˆ
∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀ j, w (88)
c′dr,j(x
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (89)
xL∗2,j(w)
(
c′dr,j(x
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀ j, w (90)
c′bo,j(z
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (91)
zL∗2,j(w)
(
c′bo,j(z
L∗
2,j(w)) − µˆ
∗
j (w)
)
= 0 ∀ j, w (92)
µˆ∗j (w)(Dj − wj − y
L∗
1,j − y
L∗
2,j(w)
− xL∗2,j(w)− z
L∗
2,j(w)) = 0 ∀w
(93)
µˆ∗j (w) ≥ 0 ∀ j, w (94)
Clearly, selecting λˆ∗1 = P1 and λˆ
∗
2(w) = P2(w) for all
w, makes (81)-(84) identical to the (GEN-Pi) KKT condi-
tions (49)-(52), and (85)-(94) identical to (LSE-Pj) KKT
conditions (53)-(62). Since (yG∗1,i , y
G∗
2,i (·)) for each i and
(yL∗1,j , y
L∗
2,j(·)) for each j form an optimal solution for (NET-
P), constraints (23) and (24) in (SPP-P) are satisfied as well,
so that overall the sequential equilibrium is feasible for (SPP-
P), and thus supports an efficient allocation.
The proof of the second statement follows directly from
the construction in the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. TWO-STAGE MECHANISM FOR ELECTRICITY
MARKET WITH RENEWABLE GENERATION
The proof of Theorem 1 showed that SCEq prices arise
from the dual solution to (SPP-P). Assume that each
cost function in the objective of (SPP-P) can be finitely
parametrized (e.g. by θ1,i in the case of c1,i). For example,
each cost function might take the form c(x) = ax2 + bx for
some θ = (a, b) ∈ R2+.
Assuming that the generators and LSEs are not strategic,
and that the distribution of W is known to all players, the
following mechanism implements the SCEq, clearing the
market at the end of stage 2:
(1) Each generator i submits (θ1,i, θ2,i) and LSE j submits
(θdr,j, θbo,j).
(2) The ISO solves (SPP-P), and announces stage 1 price
P ∗1 = λˆ
∗
1 and stage 2 price schedule P
∗
2 (·) = λˆ
∗
2(·).
(3) Generator i solves (GEN1i) and LSE j solves (LSE1j).
LSE j pays P ∗1 y
L∗
1,j , and generator i receives P
∗
1 y
G∗
1,i .
(4) At the start of stage 2, the renewable generation output
W = w is observed by both the generators and LSEs.
Generator i solves (GEN2i) and LSE j solves (LSE2j).
LSE j pays P ∗2 (w)y
L∗
2,j(w), and generator i receives
P ∗2 (w)y
G∗
2,i (w).
(5) Generator i produces yG∗1,i + y
G∗
2,i (w), and the LSE
receives yL∗1,j + y
L∗
2,j(w).
In step (2) of the mechanism above, the ISO must
announce prices to the generator and the LSE. We note
here that, due to (SPP-P) KKT conditions (35)-(38) and
Assumption 1, if yˆG∗1,i > 0 for some i, that λˆ
∗
1 is uniquely
defined as c′1,i(yˆ
G∗
1,i ). If yˆ
G∗
1,i = 0 for all i, then λˆ
∗
1 may not
be unique, but λˆ∗1 = mini c
′
1,i(0) selects the highest lower
bound available, so that (39) is still satisfied. Similarly if,
for a given w, yˆG∗2,i (w) > 0 for some i, then λˆ
∗
2(w) is
uniquely defined as c′2,i(yˆ
G∗
2,i (w)). If yˆ
G∗
2,i (w) = 0 for all
i, then λˆ∗2(w) = mini c
′
2,i(0) again selects the highest lower
bound available, so that (41) is satisfied.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a two stage market mech-
anism wherein the economic dispatch problem is formulated
as a two stage stochastic program with recourse. The design
of this mechanism follows from the proof of our main result,
the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium in this
two stage setting. We also establish that every competitive
equilibrium supports an efficient allocation, and conversely
every efficient allocation can be supported by a sequential
competitive equilibrium. We have ignored network topology
for the sake of simplicity though that could be incorporated
as well, and will be completed in future work. Market
participants are regarded as nonstrategic. In the future, we
will consider strategic generators and LSEs, and investigate
incentive compatible properties of the market mechanism
designed in Section IV, as well as design one if it is found
to be deficient.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Defining
g(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , yˆ
G
2 (w), yˆ
L
2 (w), xˆ
L
2 (w), zˆ
L
2 (w)) :=
−
∑
i
(
c1,i(yˆ
G
1,i) + c2,i(yˆ
G
2,i(w)
)
−
∑
j
cdr,j(xˆ
L
2,j(w)) + cbo,j(zˆ
L
2,j(w)),
(95)
by the interchangeability principle (Theorem 7.80) in [9]
E

 supyˆG2 (w)∈Ri
yˆL
2
(w),xˆL
2
(w)
zˆL
2
(w)∈Rj
g(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , yˆ
G
2 (w), yˆ
L
2 (w), xˆ
L
2 (w), zˆ
L
2 (w))


= sup
yˆG
2
(·)∈Ri
yˆL
2
(·),xˆL
2
(·)
zˆL
2
(·)∈Rj
E[g(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , yˆ
G
2 (·), yˆ
L
2 (·), xˆ
L
2 (·), zˆ
L
2 (·))]
(96)
While the optimization on the lefthand side of (96) is over
scalar variables, on the lefthand side, the optimization is over
mappings from Ω to Ri and Rj , where Ω is the finite set of
scenarios defined in section II.
The two-stage problem (SPP1) can be written as the
maximization over yˆG1 ≥ 0 and yˆ
L
1 ≥ 0 of
E

 maxyˆG2 (w),yˆL2 (w)
xˆL
2
(w),zˆL
2
(w)
∈G(yˆG
1
,yˆL
1
,w)
g(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , yˆ
G
2 (w), yˆ
L
2 (w), xˆ
L
2 (w), zˆ
L
2 (w))


(97)
where G(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , w) gives the feasible set for (SPP2), given
yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , and w. Therefore, (96) implies that, using Theorem
(2.20) of [9] it is equivalent to the following single stage
program
max
yˆG
1
,yˆL
1
≥0,
yˆG
2
(·)∈Ri
yˆL
2
(·),xˆL
2
(·)
zˆL
2
(·)∈Rj
E[g(yˆG1 , yˆ
L
1 , yˆ
G
2 (w), yˆ
L
2 (w), xˆ
L
2 (w), zˆ
L
2 (w))]
(98)
s.t. (yˆG2 (w), yˆ
L
2 (w), xˆ
L
2 (w), zˆ
L
2 (w)) ∈ G(yˆ
G
1 , yˆ
L
1 , w)
(99)
∀w
Using the definitions of g and G in (98)-(99), as well as the
fact that yˆG1 and yˆ
L
1 do not depend on W , and assumption
there are finitely many scenarios, gives (SPP-P).
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